As a regular ongoing feature of our blog, we intend to produce a quantitative summary of all of the decisions of the Canadian Trade Marks Opposition Board on a monthly basis. As there is a delay between the issuance of decisions and the time they are publicly available, there will be a time lag each month before our analysis can be prepared.
This is our first edition, for the decisions of the TMOB for January 2017. In January, the TMOB released a total of 13 decisions, 9 in Section 45 cancellation proceedings, and 4 in opposition proceedings.
Section 45 Decisions
Procedural Details: Written Submissions Filed: 4
Oral Hearing Conducted: 2
Results: Registration Amended: 2
Registration Cancelled: 3
Registration Maintained: 4
Decisions of Note:
(1) Smart & Biggar v CSM Bakery Products NA, Inc. 2017 TMOB 4 (CanLII)
In this case, the trademark registration in question covered goods including jams, jellies, icing, and pie filling. The evidence filed by the registrant established that the trademark registration was in use in association with pie fillings. The trademark owner argued that the evidence should be considered to be acceptable as proof of use for related goods such as jams, jelly or icing. However, the Board concluded that having distinguished between particular goods in its trademark registration, the owner must provide some evidence of use with respect to each of the listed goods.
(2) Sharlene Loveless v Estee Lauder Cosmetics Ltd. 2017 TMOB 5 (CanLII) An important exeception to the requirement to provide evidence of use in response to a Section 45 Notice, in the absence of which the registration will be cancelled, is the filing of evidence of exceptional circumstances which excuse the non-use. In this case, it was held that the non-use was due to nothing other than a voluntary business decision, which is not the sort of uncommon, unusual or exceptional circumstances that constitute special circumstances.
(3) Miller Thomson LLP v Hilton Worldwide Holding LLP 2017 TMOB 19 (CanLII) The Board pointed out in this decision that the interpretation of the goods and services must be a purposive construction rather than an academic interpretation. The services in question in this case were “hotel services”, and since there was no hotel in Canada, any argument that the services were provided in Canada could not succeed. With respect to the “special circumstances” defence, the Board held that it was key to consider the time period of the non-use. Here, there had been over 26 years of non-use from the date of the registration. No details were provided on the progress of the negotiations to open a hotel, and there was no real indication as to when use of the mark would actually commence. *An appeal has now been filed from this decision with the Federal Court.
Opposition Proceedings
Procedural Details: Opponent’s Evidence Filed: 4
Applicant’s Evidence Filed: 3
Reply Evidence Filed: 1
Cross-Examinations Conducted: 1
Written Arguments Filed: 3
Oral Hearing: 3
Grounds of Opposition: Confusion-based Grounds: 4
Results: Application Refused: 3
Opposition Rejected: 1
Decisions of Note:
(1) Vitamin Health, Inc. v Santé Naturelle A.G. Ltée 2017 TMOB 8 (CanLII) This decision sheds light on the scope of cross-examinationsin opposition proceedings, and in particular requests to have the Board draw negative inferences following refusals to answer cross-examination questions. In its arguments before the Board, the applicant was attempting to attack the opponent’s use on the basis that the opponent’s sales contravened regulations regarding the sale of natural health products. However, the question of non-compliance with these regulations had not at the time of the cross-examinations been indicated on the record. Accordingly, the objections to the cross-examination questions were well-founded. The opponent’s rights to use its trademark is not a question to be determined in the context of opposition proceedings, and so none of the questions were relevant.
(2) AIL International Inc. v Canadian Energy Services L.P. 2017 TMOB 2 (CanLII) This case involved the applicant’s trademark SUPERCORR, for chemicals, and the opponent’s trademark SUPER-COR covering corrugated drain pipe. The Board held that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the applicant had established that there was use of its mark under license. There was no evidence of quality control or of public notice. However, the Board held that there was no likelihood of confusion in this case. The Board pointed out that the result might have been different if the ground of opposition based on non-distinctiveness had been broadened. This ground as pleaded was based solely on the opponent’s activities in association with its mark. The Board stated that the opponent could have requested leave to amend its Statement of Opposition after seeing the deficiencies in the applicant’s evidence. They noted that this is quite a common practice and that such leave is regularly granted. If the opponent had then alleged that the trademark was not distinctive in Canada owing to the activities of the applicant’s licensee, the opposition might well have succeeded.